In seeking to understand the root causes of the events of 9/11 many accounts have turned to Samuel P. Huntington's provocative and controversial thesis of a 'clash of civilizations', arousing strong debate. Evidence from the 1995-2001 waves of the World Values Study allows us, for the first time, to examine an extensive body of empirical evidence relating to this debate.
Comparative analysis of the beliefs and values of Islamic and non-Islamic publics in 75 societies around the globe, confirms the first claim in Huntington's thesis: culture does matter, and indeed matters a lot, so that religious legacies leave a distinct imprint on contemporary values. But Huntington is mistaken in assuming that the core clash between the West and Islamic worlds concerns democracy. The evidence suggests striking similarities in the political values held in these societies. It is true that Islamic publics differ from Western publics concerning the role of religious leadership in society, but this is not a simple dichotomous clash--many non-Islamic societies side with the Islamic ones on this issue. Moreover the Huntington thesis fails to identify the most basic cultural fault line between the West and Islam, which concerns the issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization. The cultural gulf separating Islam from the West involves Eros far more than Demos.
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concerns political values: instead the evidence indicates that surprisingly similar attitudes towards democracy are found in the West and the Islamic world. We do find significant cross-cultural differences concerning the role of religious leaders in politics and society, but these attitudes divide the West from many other countries around the globe, not just Islamic ones. The original thesis erroneously assumed that the primary cultural fault line between the West and Islam concerns government, overlooking a stronger cultural divide based on issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization. Cohort analysis suggests that as younger generations in the West have gradually become more liberal on these issues, this has generated a growing cultural gap, with Islamic nations remaining the most traditional societies in the world. The central values separating Islam and the West revolve far more centrally around Eros than Demos.
Part I: The 'Clash of Civilizations' Debate
The 'clash of civilizations' thesis advances three central claims. First, Huntington suggests that 'culture matters'; in particular that contemporary values in different societies are path-dependent, reflecting long-standing legacies associated with core 'civilizations'. The concept of 'civilization' is understood by Huntington as a 'culture writ large': "It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people." (Huntington 1996: 41-43) . Of these factors, Huntington sees religion as the central defining element (p.47), although he also distinguishes regional sub-divisions within the major world religions, such as the distinct role of Catholicism in Western Europe and Latin America, due to their different historical traditions and political legacies. Second, the 'clash' thesis claims that there are sharp cultural differences between the core political values common in societies sharing a Western Christian heritage --particularly those concerning representative democracy --and the beliefs common in the rest of the world, especially Islamic societies. For Huntington, the defining features of Western civilization include the separation of religious and secular authority, the rule of law and social pluralism, the parliamentary institutions of representative government, and the protection of individual rights and civil liberties as the buffer between citizens and the power of the state: "Individually almost none of these factors was unique to the West. The combination of them was, however, and this is what gave the West its distinctive quality. " (1996: 70-71) Other accounts have commonly stressed that the complex phenomenon of 'modernization' encompasses many additional social values that challenge traditional beliefs, notably faith in scientific and technological progress, belief in the role of economic competition in the marketplace, and the diffusion of modern social mores, exemplified by sexual liberalization and equality for women (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003) . But
Huntington's claim is that the strongest distinguishing characteristic of Western culture, the aspect which demarcates Western Christianity most clearly from the Muslim and Orthodox worlds, concerns 4 the values associated with representative democracy. This claim is given plausibility by the failure of electoral democracy to take root in most states in the Middle East and North Africa (see Midlarsky 1998 ). According to the annual assessment made by the Freedom House (2002) , of the 192 countries around the world, two-thirds (121) are electoral democracies. Of the 47 countries with an Islamic majority, one quarter (11) are electoral democracies. Furthermore, none of the core Arabic-speaking societies in the Middle East and North Africa falls into this category. Given this pattern, in the absence of survey evidence concerning the actual beliefs of Islamic publics, it is commonly assumed that they have little faith in the principles or performance of democracy, preferring strong leadership and rule by traditional religious authorities to the democratic values of pluralistic competition, political participation, and political rights and civil liberties.
Lastly, Huntington argues that important and long-standing differences in political values based on predominant religious cultures will lead to conflict between and within nation-states, with the most central problems of global politics arising from an ethno-religious 'clash' 1 . It remains unclear whether Huntington is claiming that the core cleavage concerns Western democratic values versus the developing world, or whether the main contrast lies as a fault line between the West and Islam, but the latter has been the primary popular interpretation of the thesis, and the one which has aroused the most heated debate.
Middle Eastern area studies specialists, scholars of the Koran, and students of Islamic law have contested a series of issues about the 'clash' thesis. Critics have challenged the notion of a single Islamic culture, pointing to substantial contrasts found among one billion people living in diverse Islamic nations, such as Pakistan, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Turkey, and the differences between Muslims who are radical or moderate, traditional or modern, conservative or liberal, hard-line or revisionist (Hunter 1998; Esposito 1997; Fuller 2002) . Observers stress the manifold differences within the Islamic world due to historical traditions and colonial legacies, ethnic cleavages, levels of economic development, and the role and power of religious fundamentalists in different states, claiming that it makes little sense to lump together people living in Jakarta, Riyadh, and Istanbul. Along similar lines, the idea that we can recognize a single culture of 'Western Christianity' is to over-simplify major cross-national differences, even among affluent postindustrial societies as superficially similar as the United States, Italy, and Sweden, for example the contrasts between Catholic Mediterranean Europe and Protestant Scandinavia, as well as among social sectors and religious denominations within each country.
Moreover, setting this issue aside for the moment, even if we accept the existence of a shared 'Islamic' culture, scholars have also argued that the core values and teaching of the Koran are not incompatible with those of democracy (Kabuli 1994; Esposito and Voll 1996; Shadid 2001 (Miller and Feinberg 2002) . 
Classifying cultural regions
In Huntington's account nine major contemporary civilizations can be identified, based largely on the predominant religious legacy in each society:
• Western Christianity (a European culture that subsequently spread to North America, Australia and New Zealand),
• Islamic (including the Middle East, Northern Africa, and parts of South East Asia),
• Orthodox (Russian and Greek),
• Latin American (predominately Catholic yet with a distinct corporatist, authoritarian culture),
• Sinic/ Confucian (China, South Korean, Vietnam and Korea),
• Japanese,
• Hindu,
• Buddhist (Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia), and (possibly)
• Sub-Saharan Africa 5 .
Huntington treats states or societies as the core actors exemplifying these civilizations, although recognizing that populations with particular cultural and religious identities spread well beyond the border of the nation-state. Moreover some plural societies are deeply divided, so there is rarely a clean one-to-one mapping, apart from exceptional cases such as Japan and India.
To analyze the survey evidence for these propositions, societies were classified into these categories, (see Table 1 ) based on the predominant (plurality) religious identities within each nation.
The [ analysis among the pooled sample (not reproduced here) showed that all the items fell into one dimension and formed a consistent and reliable 'strength of religiosity' scale (Cronbach's Alpha =0.48). After recoding, the scale was standardized to 100-points, for ease of interpretation, where the higher score represents the strongest religiosity.
Measuring Political and Social Values
Attitudes were compared towards three dimensions of political and social values: (i) support for democratic ideals and performance, (ii) attitudes towards political leadership, and (iii) approval of gender equality and sexual liberalization. As argued elsewhere (Norris 1999) , an important distinction needs to be drawn between support for the ideals of democracy and evaluations of the actual performance of democracy. Evidence from previous waves of the World Value Study (Klingemann 1999; Dalton 1999) suggests that citizens in many countries adhere strongly to the general principles of democracy, such as believing that it is the best form of government and disapproving of authoritarian alternatives, and yet at the same time many remain deeply dissatisfied with the way that democratic governments work in practice. The phenomenon of more 'critical citizens' (Norris 1999) or 'disenchanted democrats' (Putnam and Pharr 2001) has been widely observed. To examine these dimensions, attitudes towards the principles and performance of democracy are measured in this study using the items listed in Table 2 , where respondents are invited to express agreement or disagreement with the statements. It should be noted that the performance items do not ask people about their experience of democracy in their own country, such as how well their government works, but rather taps their expectations of how well democratic governments generally function in taking decisions and maintaining order.
In addition, it is commonly assumed that one of the primary contrasts between Islamic and
Western cultures relates to attitudes towards the role of religious leaders, who exercise power by virtue of their spiritual authority, or secular leaders who hold authority through elective office, reflecting deeper beliefs about the separation of church and state. We therefore also monitored support for the role of religious leaders in public life with the items listed in Table 2 . Neither of these items cued respondents with any explicit reference to 'democracy' and indeed, in principle, there is no inconsistency in believing both in the value of spiritual authorities and in the principles of democracy, if the religious leaders exercise power through elected office, exemplified by Christian Democrat parties or politicians from the Christian far right. We also sought to compare attitudes towards preferences for strong leadership, measured by questions tapping support for non-democratic forms of government by experts or by leaders unaccountable to parliament or elections. Factor analysis confirmed that these political items did indeed fall into four distinct dimensions. Accordingly summary scales were constructed, each standardized to 100-points for ease of interpretation and consistent comparison across measures.
[ Table 2 about here]
Yet the alternative proposition is that the transformation of social values towards sexuality and women's equality, which has profoundly affected the younger generation in postindustrial societies, may lie at the heart of any cultural clash between modern and traditional societies in general, and between the West and Islam in particular. In this regard, Huntington may have correctly identified the importance of civilizational values, but may have misdiagnosed the root causes of any cultural differences. To explore this proposition we can compare support for gender equality, using a standardized scale developed elsewhere, also based on factor analysis, monitoring attitudes towards the roles of women and men in the workforce, education, politics, and the family 7 . The Gender Equality items are similar to those commonly contained in the more comprehensive psychological scales of sex roles. The gender equality scale was summed across the component items and standardized to 100-points for ease of interpretation. We also compared attitudes using 10-point scales monitoring approval or disapproval of three related dimensions of changing sexual mores, concerning homosexuality, abortion and divorce. [ Table 3 about here]
Part III: Analysis of the Results
Yet comparing the simple means in each type of religious culture could be misleadingly if other endogenous factors are influencing the results, such as the level of democratization or economic affluence typically found in Western and Islamic societies. The multivariate OLS regression models presented in Table 4 therefore compare the impact of living within each type of religious culture after including controls for the societal-level of human and political development, and individual-level measures for age, gender, education, income, and strength of religiosity. In these models, each type of society was coded as a dummy (0/1) variable. The Western category was excluded from the analysis, so that the dummy coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of living in these societies, after applying prior controls, compared with the effect of living in the West. The data was entered in blocks, including development and social controls in the first block, then the additional effects of the full model in the second block, including the type of society as well.
[ Table 4 about here]
The results show that after controlling for all these factors, contrary to Huntington's thesis, compared with Western societies, support for democracy was marginally slightly stronger (not weaker) [ Figure 3 and Table 5 about here]
Yet so far we have not compared the alternative modernization thesis that the social values of gender equality and sexual liberalization could plausibly lie at the heart of any 'clash' between Islam and the West. The mean scores on these social attitudes in Table 3 reveal the extent of the gulf between Islam and the West, generating a far stronger cultural gap on these issues than across most of the political values. Regression models, including the same prior controls used earlier, show that many structural factors consistently help to predict attitudes, since egalitarian and liberal values are stronger among the young, women, the well-educated, and the less religious, as well as in modern societies with greater human and democratic development. After these controls are introduced, Table   5 shows that there remains a strong and significant difference across all the social indicators (including approval of gender equality, homosexuality, abortion and divorce) among those living in Western v.
Islamic societies. Figure 4 shows the distribution of nations on the scales for gender equality and homosexuality in more detail. The results confirm the consistency of the sharp differences between
Islam and the West on these issues. All the Western nations, led by Sweden, Germany and Norway, strongly favor equality for women and also prove tolerant of homosexuality. Many other societies show a mixed pattern, falling into the middle of the distribution. In contrast the Islamic nations, including Egypt, Bangladesh, Jordan, Iran and Azerbaijan, all display the most traditional social attitudes, with only Albania proving slightly more liberal.
[ Figure 4 about here]
We lack time-series survey data that would allow us to trace trends in the post-war era, to see whether these cultural differences between societies have widened, as we suspect, due to the [ Figure 5 about here]
Conclusion and Discussion
The thesis of a 'clash of civilizations' has triggered something of a 'clash of scholarship' among those seeking to understand the causes and consequences of ethnic-religious conflict. This task has long been of interest to academe but it has received fresh impetus by the dramatic events and aftermath of 9/11. Alternative interpretations of these issues are important for themselves, but also because they carry important policy implications, not least for how far differences between the United
States and Middle Eastern states primarily reflect the views of political elites and governing regimes, or whether they tap into deeper currents of public opinion. To summarize the core components of the not concern democracy--it involves issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization. III and IV (1995-2001) 19 Note: For the classification of societies see Table 1 . All items have been scaled to 0-100. The significance of the difference between group means is measured by ANOVA (Eta) without any controls. *** Sig. P.000
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Source: The World Values Study, Waves III and IV (1995-2001) 20 Miller and Feinberg (2002) . 3 Full methodological details about the World Values Study, including the questionnaires, sampling procedures, fieldwork procedures, principle investigators, and organization can be found at: http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/wvs-samp.html. The four waves of this survey took place from 1981 to 2001, although it should be noted that all countries were not included in each wave. 4 In addition a distinct 'Jewish' culture could be identified, but Israel was not included within the current release of the WVS.
5 Although it should be noted that despite the centrality of the concept, the definition, labeling and classification of 'civilizations'
remains inconsistent in Huntington's work, for example it remains unclear whether Huntington believes that there is or is not a distinct African civilization, and the major discussion of types (pp.45-47) excludes the Orthodox category altogether. The combined 100-pt gender equality scale is based on the following 5 items: MENPOL Q118: "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do." (Agree coded low); MENJOBS Q78: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." (Agree coded low); BOYEDUC Q.119: "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl." (Agree coded low); NEEDKID Q110 "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?" (Agree coded low); SGLMUM Q112 "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?" (disapprove coded low). Three items used statements with Lickert-style 4-point agree-disagree responses, while two used dichotomies, and these items were all recoded so that higher values consistently represent greater support for gender equality. 
